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Abstract 9 
 10 
Identifying the ecological and demographic factors that promote the evolution of cooperation 11 
is a major challenge for evolutionary biologists. Explanations for the adaptive evolution of 12 
cooperation seek to determine which factors make reproduction in cooperative groups more 13 
favourable than independent breeding or other selfish strategies. A vast majority of the 14 
hypotheses posit that cooperative groups emerge in the context of philopatry, high costs of 15 
dispersal, high population density, and environmental stability. This route to cooperation, 16 
however, fails to explain a growing body of empirical evidence in which cooperation is not 17 
associated with one or more of these predictors. We propose an alternative evolutionary path 18 
towards the emergence of cooperation that accounts for the disparities observed in the current 19 
literature. We find that when dispersal is mediated by a group mode of dispersal, commonly 20 
termed budding dispersal, our mathematical model reveals an association between 21 
cooperation and immigration, lower costs of dispersal, low population density, and 22 
environmental variability. Furthermore, by studying the continuum from the individual to the 23 
partial and full budding mode of dispersal, we can explicitly explain why the correlates of 24 
cooperation change under budding. This enables us to outline a general model for the 25 
evolution of cooperation that accounts for a substantial amount of empirical evidence. Our 26 
results suggest that evolution may have favoured two major contrasting pathways for the 27 
evolution of cooperation depending on a set of key ecological and demographic factors.  28 
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 3 
Introduction 34 
 35 
Understanding the origin of cooperation poses a problem for evolutionary biologists 36 
(Hamilton, 1964, 1996; Maynard Smith & Szathmáry, 1996; West et al., 2007). Natural 37 
selection favours those individuals who are best adapted to their environment so that, through 38 
differential reproduction, their genetic variants become over-represented in the gene pool of 39 
future populations (Darwin, 1959; Fisher, 1930; Price, 1970). It is then puzzling why 40 
individuals are willing to suffer a reproductive cost to help with the reproduction of their 41 
social partners. Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory provides an answer: natural selection 42 
promotes the costly transfer of resources to others whenever donors and beneficiaries are 43 
closely related (Hamilton, 1964). When social interactions occur between genetically related 44 
individuals, donors still increase their own genetic representation in future generations, albeit 45 
indirectly, through copies of their genes that are present in the beneficiaries of their actions 46 
(Hamilton, 1964, 1970).  47 
 48 
Limited dispersal, whereby individuals tend to remain near their place of birth, provides a 49 
simple and general mechanism for generating groups of close relatives. As a result, limited 50 
dispersal is often central to theories pertaining to the evolution of cooperative societies 51 
(Hamilton, 1964; West et al., 2007). This idea has motivated an extensive literature on the 52 
multiple ecological and demographic factors that lead to the evolution of limited dispersal, 53 
and ultimately to the evolution of cooperative breeding (e.g. Emlen, 1982, 1991; Hatchwell & 54 
Komdeur, 2000; Koenig & Dickinson, 2004, 2016). Among these factors, environmental 55 
stability, high costs of dispersal, and high density of the population have all been identified as 56 
major factors promoting the evolution of limited dispersal and / or cooperation (Komdeur, 57 
1992; Hatchwell & Komdeur, 2000; Koenig & Dickinson, 2016). For instance, in the social 58 
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allodapine bee Exoneura nigrescens, the removal of nesting sites leads to higher philopatry 59 
(Langer et al., 2004). In the paper wasp Mischocyttarus mexicanus, solitary nesting is more 60 
common when population density is low, and nest availability and quality is high (Gunnels et 61 
al., 2008). In the Seychelles warblers, a sudden availability of breeding sites has been shown 62 
to disrupt both kin groups and cooperative behaviour (Komdeur, 1992). In African mole-rats, 63 
a comparative analysis has shown an association between harsh environments and low food 64 
density with the size of social groups (Faulkes et al., 1997). In the Hornbills avian family, a 65 
phylogenetic analysis found a positive association between climatic stability and cooperative 66 
reproduction (Gonzalez et al., 2013).  67 
 68 
Several authors have attempted to synthesise this wealth of empirical findings to produce a 69 
general model of the ecological and demographic factors influencing the evolution of 70 
cooperation. For instance, the “habitat saturation” hypothesis, emphasises the role of 71 
population density in the evolution of limited dispersal, and how this favours the evolution of 72 
cooperation (Selander, 1964; Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982). The “benefits of philopatry” 73 
hypothesis, emphasises the role of the benefits obtained in the natal nest, and how this 74 
facilitates cooperation (Stacey & Ligon, 1987, 1991). Notwithstanding the specific emphasis 75 
of each model, they all converge on the importance of ecological and demographic 76 
constraints for the evolution of delayed or limited dispersal as a primary factor favouring the 77 
evolution of cooperative behaviour (Emlen, 1982, 1991; Koenig et al., 1992; Hatchwell & 78 
Komdeur, 2000).  79 
 80 
In an increasing number of species, however, the ecological constraints model seems to be at 81 
odds with the empirical evidence, which has shown instances where cooperation is not 82 
associated with one or more classic predictors of sociality. In several species, cooperation has 83 
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been found to be associated with immigration, such as in wild western gorillas (Gorilla 84 
gorilla; Bradley et al., 2007), white-winged choughs (Corcorax melanorhamphos; Heinsohn 85 
et al., 2000), long-tailed tits (Aegithalos caudatus; Sharp et al., 2008), or in a ciliate protozoa 86 
(Tetrahymena thermophila; Schtickzelle et al., 2009; Jacob et al., 2016). Further molecular 87 
analysis, in gorillas, white-winged choughs, and long-tailed tits, has shown a high degree of 88 
kinship among immigrants (Heinsohn et al., 2000; Bradley et al., 2007; Sharp et al., 2008). 89 
These findings are consistent with a group mode of dispersal, commonly termed ‘budding’ 90 
(e.g. Goodnight, 1992; Gardner & West, 2006), a behaviour also observed in other social 91 
species such as in bacteria (Myxococcus xanthus, Velicer & Yu, 2003), and banded 92 
mongooses (Mungos mungo, Cant et al., 2001; Nichols et al., 2012). This empirical evidence 93 
suggests an alternative evolutionary path to the emergence of cooperation, in which 94 
cooperation is mediated by the budding mode of dispersal, and yet this problem has received 95 
surprisingly little attention (for a review see Cote et al. 2017). Specifically, how different 96 
ecological and demographic factors, such as environmental stability and the cost of dispersal, 97 
influence the evolution of budding dispersal and cooperation remains unexplored.  98 
 99 
Here we develop a theoretical model to study how multiple ecological and demographic 100 
factors influence the evolution of dispersal under budding and how this, in turn, influences 101 
the evolution of cooperation. We describe how temporal variation in resource availability 102 
mediates multiple variables such as the genetic relatedness among social partners and the 103 
intensity of kin competition. We then study how these variables mediate the evolution of 104 
dispersal and how this influences the evolution of cooperative behaviours.  105 
 106 
 107 
 108 
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The Model 109 
 110 
Life-cycle 111 
 112 
Here we provide a description of the life cycle of our model organism, a visual depiction of 113 
which can be found in Figure 1. We assume a population of asexually-reproducing and 114 
haploid individuals subdivided into a very large number of patches (i.e. an infinite island 115 
model; Wright, 1931; Hamilton & May, 1977; Rodrigues & Gardner, 2012). A fraction p of 116 
these patches is habitable, while a fraction 1-p is uninhabitable. Each habitable patch is 117 
occupied by n mothers. Uninhabitable patches lack resources to sustain life, and therefore 118 
they are “empty”. Each of the n mothers has a very large number of offspring, F(xA,yA), 119 
which is a function both of the focal mother’s investment in cooperation, xA, and the focal 120 
groups’, including the focal mother, average investment in cooperation, yA, in a population 121 
where the average investment in cooperation is zA. We discuss the social behaviour in more 122 
detail below. After social interactions and reproduction, mothers die. Juveniles become adult 123 
females, who form buds. We assume that each bud has n adults. Each bud disperses to a 124 
random patch in the population with probability zD and remains in its natal patch with 125 
probability 1-zD. Migrant buds are assumed to survive dispersal with probability 1-k, where k 126 
is the cost of dispersal. After dispersal, in the previously occupied patches, there is 127 
competition between migrant and native buds for the n available breeding sites, whilst in 128 
previously empty patches, competition occurs among immigrant buds only. Only one bud 129 
wins, the remainder buds die. After group competition, there is an exchange of adult females 130 
between patches, so that adult females remain in their patch with probability 1-m, and move 131 
to another patch with probability m. The exchange of adult females between patches sustains 132 
some genetic variation within each group, which would otherwise be clonal (cf. Gardner & 133 
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West, 2006). We can also interpret migration as a mutation rate, which can be considered as 134 
interchangeable in, for example, bacterial populations (e.g. O’Brien et al., 2013). As 135 
migration, mutation introduces within-group variation, and in the context of our model is 136 
conceptually equivalent. Following movement of adult females, the ecological state of 137 
patches may change. With probability α habitable patches produce a surplus of resources so 138 
that all offspring born in the patch are viable. However, with probability 1-α, disturbances 139 
(such as wildfires or floods) destroy all the available resources, which leads to the premature 140 
death of all of the resident mothers. With probability β, uninhabitable patches do not recover 141 
and remain barren, whilst with probability 1-β, uninhabitable patches recover their viability 142 
and become habitable again. After these ecological changes, the life-cycle of our model 143 
species returns to its starting point.  144 
 145 
Methods and Analysis 146 
 147 
We employ the neighbour-modulated approach to kin selection (Taylor & Frank, 1996; 148 
Frank, 1998; Rodrigues & Gardner, 2013b) to determine how natural selection acts on the 149 
adaptive evolution of dispersal and cooperation. We first analyse the evolution of dispersal, 150 
and we then focus on the evolution of cooperation (see Appendix for details).  151 
 152 
Hamilton’s Rule: Dispersal 153 
 154 
We find that the condition for natural selection to favour the evolution of dispersal, a form of 155 
Hamilton’s rule (Hamilton, 1964; Charnov, 1977), is given by:  156 
 157 
−𝑣O + (1 − 𝑘)(𝑝𝑣O + (1 − 𝑝)𝑣E) + 𝑣Oℎ𝑅 > 0,                                                                   (1) 158 
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 159 
where: vO = ωOα/(α+1-β) is the reproductive value of a juvenile competing for a breeding site 160 
in an occupied patch, where ωO = 1/((1-zD)+zDp(1-k)) is the probability that a focal individual 161 
wins a breeding spot, and α/(α+1-β) is the relative probability that the patch remains 162 
habitable; vE = ωE(1-β)/(α+1-β) is the reproductive value of a juvenile competing for a 163 
breeding site in an empty patch, in which ωE = 1/(zDp(1-k)) is the probability that a focal 164 
individual wins a breeding spot, and (1-β)/(α+1-β) is the relative probability that an empty 165 
patch becomes habitable; h = (1-zD)/((1-zD)+zDp(1-k)) is the probability that a random 166 
individual, after dispersal, was born in the focal patch; and R = 1/(n-(n-1)(1-m)2) is the 167 
relatedness among group members.  168 
 169 
The left-hand side (LHS) of inequality (1) readily yields an inclusive fitness interpretation of 170 
the behaviour. The first term represents a direct fitness cost of dispersing to a juvenile. A 171 
disperser loses a reproductive value vO, which is the reproductive value she would have won 172 
had she decided to stay in her natal patch. The second term represents a direct fitness benefit 173 
of dispersing to the focal juvenile. She survives dispersal with probability 1-k. With 174 
probability p, she arrives at an occupied patch, in which case she obtains a reproductive value 175 
vO, whilst with probability 1-p, she arrives at an empty patch, in which case she obtains a 176 
reproductive value vE. Finally, the third term represents an indirect fitness benefit to the focal 177 
juvenile. With probability h the benefit goes to a native individual whose relatedness to the 178 
focal individual is R, and where the beneficiaries obtain a reproductive value vO. 179 
 180 
 181 
 182 
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 183 
Hamilton’s Rule: Cooperation 184 
 185 
We focus on a social trait in which a mother pays a fecundity cost C to provide a fecundity 186 
benefit B to her social partners, including herself. The condition for natural selection to 187 
favour the evolution of cooperation is then given by 188 
 
189 
−𝐶𝑣 + 𝐵𝑣𝑅 − (𝐵 − 𝐶)𝑣Pℎ𝑅 > 0,                                                                                          (2) 190 
 191 
where v is the reproductive value of an offspring at birth and vP = (1-zD)vO is the philopatric 192 
component of an offspring’s reproductive value. That is, an offspring remains in its natal 193 
patch with probability 1-zD, in which case it obtains a reproductive value vO.  194 
 195 
The LHS of inequality (2) readily yields an inclusive fitness interpretation of the behaviour. 196 
The first term represents a direct fitness cost to the focal mother. She has C fewer offspring, 197 
whose reproductive value would have been v. The second term represents an indirect fitness 198 
benefit to the focal mother. Her behaviour improves the fecundity of all group members by a 199 
total of B offspring, whose reproductive value is v, a benefit that must be discounted by the 200 
relatedness R. Finally, the third term represents an inclusive fitness cost to the focal mother. 201 
Her behaviour displaces B-C offspring, who were born in the local patch with probability h. 202 
Each displaced offspring represents a cost vP to the actor, a cost that must be discounted by 203 
the relatedness R.    204 
 205 
The cost and benefit of cooperation are given by the slopes of fecundity on the phenotype of 206 
individuals (i.e. -C = ∂F(xA,yA)/∂xA, and B = ∂F(xA,yA)/∂yA); see Appendix D for details). We 207 
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assume that fecundity depends on the relative competitiveness of each mother within each 208 
group, and on the public good available to each group member. Investment in cooperation 209 
(xA) decreases an individual’s relative competitiveness within each group but increases the 210 
amount of the public good available. In order to plot ES cooperation strategies, we assume 211 
that the fecundity of a focal individual is given by F(xA,yA) = ((1-xA)/(1-yA))yA (cf. Frank, 212 
1994). Thus, C(zA) = zA/(1- zA), and B(zA) = 1/(1- zA). In the appendix, we show that the 213 
specific functional form does not have a qualitative impact on our results. 214 
 215 
Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness 216 
 217 
Above we have considered a particular partition of Hamilton’s rule, in which each additive 218 
term represents a selective pressure and where the costs (C’s) and benefits (B’s) are given in 219 
number of offspring. In the original formulation of Hamilton’s rule, however, selection is 220 
partitioned into additive direct and indirect fitness components, and costs and benefits are 221 
given in terms of fitness (Hamilton 1964). This original formulation of Hamilton’s rule can 222 
be recovered by re-arranging the LHS’s of inequalities (1) and (2) and by considering the 223 
‘others-only’ coefficient of relatedness, rather than the ‘whole-group’ coefficient of 224 
relatedness (Pepper 2000). Hamilton’s rule for the evolution of dispersal becomes 225 
 226 
−(𝑣O − (1 − 𝑘)(𝑝𝑣O + (1 − 𝑝)𝑣E) − 𝑣Oℎ
1
𝑛
)⏟                            
𝑐
+ 𝑣Oℎ
𝑛−1
𝑛⏟    
𝑏
𝑟 > 0,                                          (3) 227 
 228 
where: c is the fitness cost of the behaviour; b is the fitness benefit of the behaviour; and r is 229 
the ‘others-only’ relatedness between actor and recipients. The direct fitness effect is then 230 
given by –c whereas the indirect fitness effect is given by br. Likewise, Hamilton’s rule for 231 
the evolution of cooperation becomes 232 
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233 
−(𝐶𝑣 − 𝐵𝑣
1
𝑛
+ (𝐵 − 𝐶)𝑣Pℎ
1
𝑛
)⏟                  
𝑐′
+ (𝐵𝑣
𝑛−1
𝑛
− (𝐵 − 𝐶)𝑣Pℎ
𝑛−1
𝑛
)⏟                  
𝑏′
𝑟 > 0.                                (4) 234 
 235 
Evolutionarily Stables Strategies 236 
 237 
Our aim is to find the Evolutionarily Stable (ES) dispersal, denoted by zD
*, and the ES 238 
investment in cooperation, denoted by zA
*. An evolutionary singular dispersal (or 239 
cooperative) strategy occurs when natural selection favours neither a slight increase nor a 240 
slight decrease in the probability of dispersal (or in cooperation). This evolutionary 241 
equilibrium occurs when the corresponding LHS of Hamilton’s rule is null. A joint 242 
evolutionary singularity strategy (zD
*,zA
*) occurs when the LHS of both Hamilton’s rules, as 243 
given by inequalities 1 and 2, are simultaneously null. We investigate both the convergence 244 
and evolutionary stability of these joint optimal strategies. To determine the evolutionary 245 
stability of the evolutionary singularities, we construct a genetic model that is equivalent to 246 
our kin selection model (Ajar, 2003; Wild, 2011; Rodrigues & Johnstone, 2014; Appendix 247 
E). We use this genetic model to check the validity of the analytical results derived from our 248 
kin selection model, and to check the convergence stability (Christiansen, 1991; Eshel, 1996), 249 
and the evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973; Metz & Gyllenberg, 2001; 250 
Ajar, 2003; Rodrigues & Johnstone 2014) of the joint optimal strategies (Appendix E). Our 251 
analysis suggests that all evolutionary singular strategies are both convergence and 252 
evolutionarily stable (Appendix F).  253 
 254 
Results 255 
 256 
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Here we describe the evolution of cooperation and dispersal with respect to the cost of 257 
dispersal (k), proportion of habitable patches (p), and the temporal stability of the local 258 
environment (τ), where 𝜏 = 𝛼 − (1 − 𝛽). We explore how the different model parameters 259 
influence the ES dispersal rate (zD
*) and the ES investment in cooperation (zA
*). We analyse 260 
our results in terms of the relative direct (υD = (1-k)(pvO+(1-p)vE)/vO) and relative indirect (ρD 261 
= vOhR/vO) benefits of dispersal, and in terms of the relative kin-selected benefits (υA = vR/v), 262 
and the relative kin competition costs (ρA = vPhR/v) of cooperation (Figures 2 - 4).  263 
 264 
How does the cost of dispersal influence cooperation (Figure 2)? We find that, in general, 265 
higher costs of dispersal have a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation (Figure 2 266 
(d)). When many dispersers die in transit between patches, fewer immigrants arrive at each 267 
patch. This increases kin competition, which disfavours the evolution of cooperation (Figure 268 
2 (c)). In addition, higher dispersal costs reduce the benefits of dispersal (Figure 2 (a)), which 269 
leads to lower ES dispersal rates. This, in turn, further increases the intensity of kin 270 
competition, and the corresponding costs associated with cooperation. Counter to intuition, 271 
when the environment is unstable and the cost of dispersal is already high, dispersal tends to 272 
rise with increasing cost of dispersal (Figure 2 (b)). This is because higher costs of dispersal 273 
increase the competition among close relatives, and therefore it also increases the indirect 274 
fitness benefits to dispersers. In other words, even if a disperser is likely to perish in a 275 
dispersal event, they will indirectly benefit as their kin left behind will benefit from reduced 276 
competition within the patch. How does the cost of dispersal in unstable environments 277 
influence the evolution of cooperation? Two opposing factors drive the evolution of 278 
cooperation. First, the cost of dispersal leads to less immigration and therefore to higher kin 279 
competition for local resources. Second, higher kin competition leads to higher dispersal 280 
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rates, which in turn erodes kin competition. Overall, the cost of dispersal increases the 281 
intensity of kin competition, which disfavours the evolution of cooperation (Figure 2).  282 
 283 
How does habitat occupancy (p) mediate investment in cooperation (Figure 3)? We find that 284 
when the local environment is stable (temporal correlation, τ ≈ 1), cooperation increases with 285 
habitat occupancy. By contrast, when the local environment is unstable (τ << 1), cooperation 286 
decreases with habitat occupancy (Figure 3 (c & d)). In stable environments, barren patches 287 
rarely become fertile again, and therefore any immigrant that lands in one of these patches is 288 
unlikely to reproduce. As a result, higher habitat occupancy decreases the chances that 289 
dispersers migrate to a barren patch, which increases the expected direct benefits of dispersal, 290 
which leads to higher ES dispersal rates (Figure 3 (a & b)). Higher dispersal rates from 291 
occupied patches reduce the intensity of local kin competition, and therefore cooperation 292 
becomes more beneficial (Figure 3 (d)).  293 
 294 
When the local environment is unstable (τ < 1), higher habitat occupancy leads to lower 295 
direct benefits of dispersal (Figure 3 (a)). The value of occupied patches is now greatly 296 
reduced because: (i) they have higher competition (as they have philopatric individuals and 297 
not only immigrants), and (ii) they may be more likely to become extinct (if τ < 0). When the 298 
fraction of poor quality occupied patches increases in the population, dispersal is disfavoured 299 
(Figure 3 (b)). This is because dispersers are more likely to find themselves in a poorer patch 300 
after dispersal. Low dispersal rates increase the intensity of local kin competition, and this 301 
disfavours the evolution of cooperation (Figure 3 (c)).  302 
 303 
 How does temporal correlation (τ) influence the potential for cooperation (Figure 4)? We 304 
find that the potential for cooperation decreases as the environment becomes more stable 305 
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(Figure 4 (c & d)). Stable environments reduce the direct fitness benefit of dispersal (Figure 4 306 
(a)), which disfavours the evolution of dispersal (Figure 4 (b)). This leads to an increase in 307 
the intensity of kin competition, which disfavours costly investments into cooperative 308 
behaviours (Figure 4 (c & d)). In addition, temporal stability increases the value of occupied 309 
patches, which also increases the costs associated with kin competition (Figure 4 (c)). This 310 
additional factor further disfavours investment into cooperation (Figure 4 (d)).  311 
 312 
Finally, what is the relationship between dispersal and cooperation? For a large range of 313 
parameter values, we find a positive correlation between dispersal and cooperation when we 314 
vary a model parameter (Figure 5). Exceptions occur when the cost of dispersal is high and 315 
the environment is unstable (Figure 5 (a, b & d)). In this case, the ES dispersal rate of 316 
juveniles increases with the cost of dispersal. Higher dispersal rates directly oppose higher 317 
costs of dispersal, with the former acting to alleviate kin competition and the latter increasing 318 
kin competition. This latter effect is stronger than the former and, as a result of higher net kin 319 
competition, investment into cooperation decreases with increasing dispersal rates.  At 320 
intermediate levels of environmental stability, we also find a negative correlation between the 321 
dispersal rate of juveniles and investment in cooperation as patch occupancy increases 322 
(Figure 5 (f)). In some areas of parameter space the model is biologically unrealistic 323 
(represented by grey shaded areas on Figure 5). Here, there isn’t a realistic combination of 324 
parameter values ( and ) that gives values of  and p that could occur in nature (e.g. if  = – 325 
1, and p = ¼, then  is negative (– 1/2)). 326 
 327 
Individual, partial and complete budding dispersal  328 
 329 
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Above, we have explored how budding dispersal influences general patterns of cooperation 330 
as a function of the different model parameters. Here, we explore these results in three main 331 
directions. First, we investigate cases where the migration rate is set to zero. Next, we explore 332 
cases where the size of each bud is allowed to vary in relation to patch size. Finally, we 333 
explore a clonal expansion scenario, whereby each patch is colonised by a single individual 334 
who then produces offspring that fill up all of the available breeding sites.   335 
 336 
Migration rate -- In the previous sections, we have assumed that there is an exchange of 337 
individuals between groups after the dispersal stage, which sustains some within-group 338 
genetic variation. Here we explore some of the consequences of having no exchange of 339 
individuals between groups (m  0). Under this scenario, if we assume a saturated 340 
population (i.e. p = 1), we recover Taylor’s (1992) result for the evolution of cooperation 341 
when there is a single breeder per patch, in which case Taylor’s condition for the evolution of 342 
cooperation becomes B > C. In this case, individuals invest all of their resources into 343 
cooperation (i.e. zA
* = 1), irrespective of the dispersal rate. Similarly, we also recover 344 
Hamilton & May’s (1977) result for the evolution of dispersal, where the ES dispersal rate is 345 
zD
* = 1/(1+k). In other words, we find that clonal groups behave as if they were individuals, 346 
and we recover the classic results of Taylor (1992) and Hamilton & May (1977).  347 
 348 
Bud size -- Above, we showed that for a wide range of the parameter space we discover an 349 
unexpected positive correlation between dispersal and cooperation when individuals disperse 350 
in groups, where the size of each dispersing group, denoted by nB, was assumed to exactly 351 
match patch size (i.e. nB = n; Figure 5). Here, we relax this assumption and explore this result 352 
further by taking into account the size of the bud (nB) relative to the number of available 353 
breeding sites (n). In particular, we assume that the size of each bud (nB) can be less than, or 354 
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greater than, the number of available breeding sites, with nB  {1, 2, …, n, n+1,…}. Thus, 355 
when nB = 1, we have a pure individual mode of dispersal; when 1 < nB < n, we have a partial 356 
budding dispersal mode; and when nB ≥ n, we have a complete budding mode of dispersal. In 357 
the main model, we also assumed that all individuals had exactly the same fecundity. Here, 358 
we relax this assumption and we consider that a single dominant individual has higher 359 
fecundity the n – 1 subordinate individuals. Thus, FH ≥ FL, where FH is the fecundity of the 360 
dominant individual and FL is the fecundity of a subordinate individual (see Appendix G for 361 
details).  362 
 363 
As shown in Figure 6, we find that both dispersal and cooperation increase with bud size, 364 
irrespective of patch size. In particular, we find that in the limit case, under the individual 365 
mode of dispersal (i.e. nB = 1), the optimal levels of dispersal and cooperation are relatively 366 
low. As bud size increases, both dispersal and cooperation gradually rise until bud size 367 
becomes equal to, or greater than, the number of breeding spots (i.e. nB ≥ n and all breeding 368 
spots are filled by individuals from the same bud), at which point both dispersal and 369 
cooperation stabilise at their highest values.  370 
 371 
The effect of temporal stability, i.e. τ, on the optimal level of cooperation strongly depends 372 
on the mode of dispersal. Under the individual mode of dispersal (i.e. nB = 1), temporal 373 
stability and cooperation are positively correlated. Stable environments select against 374 
dispersal, which increases relatedness, and higher relatedness, in turn, favours cooperation. 375 
Unstable environments select for dispersal, which decreases relatedness. Lower relatedness, 376 
in turn, selects against cooperation. This pattern gradually changes as bud size increases and 377 
beyond a threshold bud size the coefficient of temporal stability and cooperation become 378 
negatively correlated. As under the individual mode of dispersal, stable environments are 379 
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associated with philopatry and unstable environments with dispersal when bud size increases. 380 
However, the effects of philopatry and dispersal on cooperation differ when bud size 381 
increases beyond the set threshold. Under such scenario, philopatry becomes associated with 382 
strong kin competition, which leads to the evolution of lower levels of cooperation. Dispersal 383 
becomes associated with weak kin competition, which leads to the evolution of higher levels 384 
of cooperation. 385 
 386 
Clonal expansion -- Akin to full budding dispersal is clonal colonisation. To consider this 387 
scenario, we modify the model of the previous section. In particular, we consider that a single 388 
individual colonises a patch with multiple available breeding spots that remain open. The 389 
coloniser takes up the dominant position, and then reproduces clonally, with the offspring 390 
taking up all other available breeding spots and adopting the role of subordinates (see 391 
Appendix I for details). Under these conditions, we find that the dynamics of dispersal and 392 
cooperation are similar to those observed under full budding dispersal. In particular, we find 393 
that high levels of cooperation evolve irrespective of temporal stability and of patch size (see 394 
Figure I in Appendix I). 395 
 396 
Discussion 397 
 398 
Identifying the ecological and demographic factors that shape the evolution of cooperation 399 
has been a long-standing problem for evolutionary ecologists (Koenig & Dickinson, 2004, 400 
2016; West et al., 2007). The “habitat saturation” hypothesis, for instance, suggests that high 401 
population density tends to disfavour immigration, and as a result favours the evolution of 402 
cooperation (Salender, 1964; Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982). The “benefits of philopatry” 403 
hypothesis emphasises the benefits obtained in the natal patch as a force driving philopatry, 404 
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which in turn promotes cooperative behaviour (Stacey & Ligon, 1987, 1991). Independently 405 
of the specific viewpoint of each different hypothesis, the common idea is that cooperation 406 
evolves in the context of environments with strong ecological and demographic constraints 407 
on dispersal and independent breeding, of which environmental stability, high costs of 408 
dispersal, and high population density are usually regarded as the primary constraining 409 
factors (Hatchwell & Komdeur, 2000; Koenig & Dickinson, 2016).  410 
 411 
Recent observational and experimental studies, however, have uncovered variation in 412 
cooperation that is not explained by these models. A common thread across these studies is 413 
the existence of budding or some form of group dispersal (e.g. Heinsohn et al., 2000; 414 
Williams & Rabenold, 2005; Bradley et al., 2007; Sharp et al., 2008; Jacob et al., 2016). This 415 
observation has led us to advance the central hypothesis of our study where we propose that 416 
budding may mediate a shift in the ecological and demographic variables shaping the 417 
evolution of cooperation. To test this hypothesis, we developed a kin-selection theoretical 418 
model in which we varied key factors to study their effect on the evolution of dispersal and 419 
ultimately on the evolution of cooperation. Our model supports our initial hypothesis, as we 420 
found that under budding dispersal, cooperation becomes associated with environmental 421 
instability, immigration, low costs of dispersal, and low population density. These results 422 
provide a foundation for a general model for the evolution of cooperation in which its 423 
correlates are in contrast with the ecological and demographic correlates proposed by the 424 
hypotheses based on ecological constraints.  425 
 426 
Support for our findings comes from different lines of research. For instance, white-winged 427 
choughs are cooperative breeders who live in groups of relatives that show some degree of 428 
reproductive skew. Social groups can last for several generations, but ecological 429 
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perturbations can lead to their demise. In one of such instances, severe droughts resulted in 430 
high mortality and group fragmentation (Heinsohn et al., 2000). New groups were readily 431 
established, each comprised of sub-groups of close kin and individuals of different origins. 432 
After the establishment of new groups, reproductive skew was immediately developed, and 433 
researchers found a positive correlation between reproductive success and the number of 434 
relatives present in the new groups (Heinsohn et al., 2000). Long-tailed tits are also 435 
cooperative breeders that show relatively high levels of dispersal, in which dispersers often 436 
fail to establish independent breeding. Sharp et al. (2008) has shown that around 40% of the 437 
failed breeders become helpers at an established nest, with over 30% joining the nest of a 438 
close relative. These cases illustrate situations where there is an association between 439 
relatively high immigration, high relatedness and cooperation, and in the case of white-440 
winged choughs high environmental instability, as outlined in our model.  441 
 442 
In our model, and in white-winged choughs, dispersal is partially driven by ecological 443 
disturbances. We can expect, however, that in some cases, dispersal may be caused by other 444 
factors that vary over time. For instance, sex-biased dispersal is common in sexually 445 
reproducing species, a behaviour that is often driven by the costs of inbreeding. In lions, 446 
males are the dispersing sex, while females are philopatric. Dispersal by males is particularly 447 
important when their own daughters become adult group members, in which case the costs of 448 
inbreeding rapidly escalate. Males may disperse solitarily but also in groups of different 449 
sizes, and they are more likely to associate in groups when close kin are available. Groups of 450 
males are more likely to take over a pride, and therefore improve their reproductive success 451 
(Packer et al., 1991). In brown jays, males are also the dispersing sex. Immigration is often 452 
made in groups, and not random, as males are more likely to disperse to a group where other 453 
 
 
 20 
close relatives are already present (Williams & Rabenold, 2005). This suggests that kin 454 
selection and cooperation is associated with both budding and dispersal.  455 
 456 
We also uncover the result that bud size relative to number of available breeding spots drives 457 
both the potential for cooperation and dispersal, especially under more unstable 458 
environments. This analysis provides a continuum between the individual mode of dispersal 459 
to complete budding dispersal. Cooperative breeders such as the western bluebird (Sialia 460 
Mexicana) and the superb fairy-wren (Malurus cyaneus), will often delay dispersal when 461 
food is scarce and competition for quality patches is high. Here, quality patches do not often 462 
become available, so a kin group is established and cooperative behaviours persist. However, 463 
when quality patches become available helpers will prefer to disperse individually and breed 464 
(Dickinson et al., 2014; Pruett-Jones & Lewis, 1990). As such, cooperation is established 465 
when patches are stable even under individual dispersal, however, when new patches become 466 
available relatedness will decline as groups disperse and cooperation is unlikely to be 467 
maintained.  468 
 469 
At the other end of the spectrum are eusocial insects who need a cooperative group to 470 
establish a new nest site. When a colony of honey bees (Apis mellifera) divide, the old queen 471 
will swarm with several thousand workers to find a new patch, leaving remaining resources 472 
to colony members and a new queen (Camazine et al., 1999). Here, the quality and quantity 473 
of resources in a patch will determine dispersal rate, and cooperation will remain high during 474 
dispersal through budding.  475 
 476 
Dispersal in other eusocial insects, such as the drywood termite (Cryptotermes secundus) 477 
where patch resources are limited, is dependent on ecological factors such as food 478 
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availability. When food becomes scare in the nest, there is an increase in maturation of 479 
individuals into dispersing sexuals that go on to colonise new nests as a single monogamous 480 
queen (clonal colonisation in our model) (Korb and Schmidinger, 2004). Here, patch quality 481 
determines dispersal rate, and although individual dispersal is established, clonal colonisation 482 
of empty patches ensures high relatedness and maintains selection for dispersal. These 483 
examples demonstrate the vital role ecological determinants play in the evolution of dispersal 484 
and how the dispersal strategy can act to disrupt or maintain cooperative behaviours during 485 
dispersal events, depending on whether dispersal is budding or individual. 486 
 487 
In many cases, testing theoretical predictions linked to dispersal and cooperation is not 488 
experimentally tractable in vertebrates and higher organisms. However, experimental 489 
approaches using single cellular organisms highlights the critical role of dispersal strategy in 490 
maintaining cooperative groups during dispersal events. These studies reveal budding as a 491 
key factor for resolving conflicting selective pressures between cooperation and kin 492 
competition (Kümmerli et al., 2009; Taylor et al., 2013; Jacob et al., 2016). For example, 493 
using a ciliated protozoan model system (Tetrahymena thermophile) Jacob et al. (2016) 494 
found that the aggregative behaviour of the strain (determined by their genotype) altered the 495 
plastic reaction norms of dispersal behaviour. Specifically, cooperation and dispersal are 496 
maintained via the avoidance of kin-competition through long distance dispersal, and the 497 
maintenance of kin structure thorough group dispersal. 498 
 499 
Reflecting on the results gained in this study, it is interesting to consider the parallels that 500 
may be important for vector-borne diseases, such as malaria. Malaria often exists within a 501 
host as a mixed-genotype infection, i.e. they are frequently dispersing to occupied patches 502 
(Read et al., 2002). But kinship patterns observed within an infected host suggest that 503 
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relatedness within the mosquito vector (i.e. during dispersal) is high (Nkhoma et al., 2012). 504 
Moreover, it seems that parasites can discriminate between related and non-related malaria 505 
parasites (Reece et al., 2008), suggesting kin structure to be important to the success of the 506 
parasitic lifecycle. If relatedness within the vector is high, then relatedness is not destroyed 507 
by dispersal, and a type of budding dispersal is established. Besides, theoretical work has 508 
shown that both high competition within a mixed-genotype infection (Read et al., 2002) and 509 
long distance transmission mechanisms (such as those that are vector-borne; Boots & Sasaki, 510 
1999) will select for more virulent pathogens. The consequence of this higher virulence are 511 
more unstable patch dynamics (because the host dies more quickly), and our work predicts 512 
this will also select for a higher dispersal rate. In support of this theory, a recent study found 513 
that passaging the parasitic nematode, Heterorhabditis floridensis, under conditions that 514 
resulted in low relatedness within new hosts led to reduced growth and lower virulence. In 515 
contrast, passaging under conditions that led to high relatedness within the new host led to 516 
higher growth and more virulent strains (Shapiro-Ilan & Raymond, 2016). This empirical 517 
result matches the predictions made above; nematodes that disperse to a new host while 518 
maintaining kin structure will have increased growth, resulting in decreased patch stability 519 
(as host mortality increases). These specific examples illustrate how a budding group remains 520 
competitive when entering a colonised patch, however, what remains to be experimentally 521 
tested is the longer term evolutionary consequences. Does intense within patch competition 522 
reduce patch stability and subsequently select for higher dispersal? 523 
 524 
Our results suggest that the role of the demographic and ecological correlates of cooperation 525 
strongly depend on group size. Despite this, group size has been relatively neglected in the 526 
classic hypotheses for the evolution of cooperation (Selander, 1964; Brown, 1974; Emlen, 527 
1982; Stacey & Ligon, 1987, 1991), which have largely focused on identifying the ecological 528 
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and environmental factors that lead to group formation and sociality. Our results suggest a 529 
more complex picture for the evolution of cooperation, where group size plays a pivotal role. 530 
For instance, when group size is small, the effect of environmental stability of cooperation 531 
significantly depends on the mode of dispersal. When individuals disperse independently, the 532 
degree of environmental stability has a large impact on cooperation. By contrast, when 533 
individuals disperse in a group, the degree of environmental stability has little impact on 534 
cooperation. This pattern, however, is reversed when individuals live in large social groups.   535 
 536 
Our results contrast with the idea that dispersal and cooperation should in general be 537 
negatively correlated, as proposed by classic hypotheses, such as the “habitat saturation” 538 
(Selander, 1964; Brown, 1974; Emlen, 1982) or the “benefits of philopatry” hypothesis 539 
(Stacey & Ligon, 1987, 1991). Another exception to the classic literature is the study of Le 540 
Galliard et al. (2005) that also found a positive correlation between dispersal and cooperation. 541 
However, the reasons underlying the positive correlation are diverse. In Le Galliard et al., an 542 
elevated cost of mobility leads to an increase in both dispersal and cooperation. In our study, 543 
by contrast, increased cost of dispersal leads to a decrease in both dispersal and cooperation. 544 
In Le Galliard et al., increased dispersal and cooperation occurs because the cost of mobility 545 
raises the levels of local aggregation. In our study, decreased dispersal occurs because of the 546 
direct effect of the cost of dispersal. As such, decreased cooperation occurs because costly 547 
dispersal decreases dispersal rates, and lower dispersal rates raises kin competition, which 548 
ultimately leads to decreased cooperation.   549 
 550 
Understanding the evolutionary consequences of the complex interactions between dispersal 551 
and cooperation is a non-trivial task. Species will differ in many respects regarding their life-552 
cycle, breeding system, and genetics. Extending our model to take into account species-553 
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specific biological factors presents an exciting and promising line of future research. For 554 
example, we might consider populations in which group size varies (e.g. Rodrigues & 555 
Gardner, 2013a) or cases in which group members differ in their quality (e.g. Rodrigues & 556 
Gardner, 2013b). Furthermore, one may also consider situations in which, alongside the 557 
evolution of dispersal, budding itself is also an evolving trait rather than a fixed parameter. 558 
Our analysis here provides a general framework to build and extend upon, so we might 559 
understand how budding influences the joint evolution of dispersal and cooperation within 560 
the context of a complex biological system. 561 
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Tables 780 
 781 
Table 1 | Defined list of parameters used in model 782 
Parameter Definition 
 Probability that a patch will remain habitable 
 Probability that a patch will remain inhabitable 
k 
Cost of dispersal 
m 
Probability that an adult female moves to a new patch (facilitating 
genetic exchange) 
n 
Number of mothers within a patch 
p Proportion of habitable patches 
 Temporal patch stability 
xA 
Focal mother’s investment in cooperation 
yA 
Focal group’s average investment in cooperation 
zA Population’s average investment in cooperation 
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zD 
Probability of dispersing 
 783 
 784 
 785 
 786 
 787 
 788 
 789 
Figures Legends 790 
 791 
Figure 1 | Lifecycle described by the model. Groups of mothers (n) exist within habitable 792 
patches (white), also present are non-habitable patches (grey). Individuals within the focal 793 
patch will produce F(xA,yA) offspring, yield is determined as a function of the focal mother’s 794 
investment in cooperation, xA, and the focal group’s average investment in cooperation, yA . 795 
Mature adult buds will disperse to all patches (zD) or remain in their natal patch (1 – zD) and 796 
compete for patch occupancy; migration between patches facilitates genetic exchange 797 
between buds (m). Patch quality has the potential to change after bud dispersal and 798 
competition, a patch may remain habitable (), become inhabitable (1 – ), remain 799 
inhabitable (), or become habitable (1 – ). Buds within inhabitable patches will perish; the 800 
cycle begins again. 801 
 802 
Figure 2 | [a] The direct (υD; solid lines) and indirect (ρD; dashed lines) benefit of dispersal 803 
as a function of the cost of dispersal (k). [c] The kin selected benefit (υA; solid lines) and the 804 
kin competition cost (ρA; dashed lines) as a function of the cost of dispersal (k). [b,d] The ES 805 
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dispersal rates (zD
*) and the ES investment in cooperation (zA
*) as a function of the cost of 806 
dispersal (k). Parameter values: [a-d] m = 0.01, n = 5, p = 0.5, [a,c] zD = 0.5. 807 
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Figure 3 | [a] The direct (υD; solid lines) and indirect (ρD; dashed lines) benefit of dispersal 808 
as a function of patch occupancy (p). [c] The kin selected benefit (υA; solid lines) and the kin 809 
competition cost (ρA; dashed lines) as a function of patch occupancy (p). [b,d] The ES 810 
dispersal rates (zD
*) and the ES investment in cooperation (zA
*) as a function of patch 811 
occupancy (p). Parameter values: [a-d] m = 0.01, n = 5, k = 0.5, [a,c] zD = 0.5. 812 
 813 
Figure 4 | [a] The direct (υD; solid lines) and indirect (ρD; dashed lines) benefit of dispersal 814 
as a function of the temporal correlation (τ). [c] The kin selected benefit (υA; solid lines) and 815 
the kin competition cost (ρA; dashed lines) as a function of the temporal correlation (τ). [b,d] 816 
The ES dispersal rates (zD
*) and the ES investment in cooperation (zA
*) as a function of the 817 
temporal correlation (τ). Parameter values: [a-d] m = 0.01, n = 5, p = 0.5, [a,c] zD = 0.5. 818 
 819 
Figure 5 | Sign of the correlation between dispersal and cooperation; as the cost of 820 
dispersal changes [panels a-d], as the patch occupancy changes [panels e-g], and as the 821 
temporal correlation changes [panel h], as a function of model parameters. The grey regions 822 
are not mathematically tractable. The sign is given by the partial derivatives of the ES 823 
strategies with respect to ∂ variable (either k, p, or τ) for each combination of parameter 824 
values. Parameter values: [a-h] m = 0.01, n = 5. [a,e] τ = 0.0 [b,f] τ = 0.5. [c,g] τ = 1.0. [d,h] p 825 
= 0.5. 826 
 827 
Figure 6 | ES dispersal and cooperation strategies under individual dispersal, and 828 
partial and complete budding dispersal. Bud size (nB) changes relative to patch size (n) 829 
under variable temporal instability () ranging from – 1.0 to 1.0 (see legend). Parameter 830 
values: k = 0.5, p = 0.5, FL = FH/10, m = 0.01.   831 
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